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Abstract 
This article discusses the statutory intendment pursued 
by the Indian judiciary in order to avoid the standstill 
issue of corporate criminal liability, by proper mechanism 
of fastening legal responsibility through the creation of a 
legal fiction. Far from giving corporations a shield to 
commit fraud, this concept narrows down the scope of 
escape by rejecting the plea that no one is to be held 
criminally liable for an act of another. This article studies 
the issue of how the judiciary has disallowed the notion 
that a body corporate cannot commit a criminal offence 
by reasoning out the scope of deeming fiction. This article 
also discusses the issue of one principle being 
compromised for another, arraigning the corporation 
along with the functionaries of the corporation. The 
authors argue that the principle of deeming fiction can 
capture the desirable features of other principles such as 
identification, attribution and lifting of the corporate veil. 
Further the authors demonstrate as to how this principle 
renders all other theories meaningless in the light of a 
plain statutory intendment, when put to use in its 
complete sense to have full effect. The application and use 
of various UK, USA, Canada, and Indian case laws has 
been adopted in order to understand and compare the 
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above mentioned machinery of fastening culpability to 
the money making corporations, for the offences 
committed by them. Lastly, the authors feel that the 
courts, upon proper application of mind, have considered 
the issues of participation, responsibility and 
enforceability in each case, without which it would have 
been a futile exercise. The article concludes on the note 
that a blanket application of either principle would prove 
to be detrimental and statutory intendment would fasten 
the liability of deemed culpability, and proceeds against 
the corporation or the director or both, accordingly. 
Keywords: Alter Ego, Attribution, Corporate Criminal Liability, 
Deeming Fiction, Identification. 
Introduction  
Individuals and corporations have always been in the news 
wherein maximizing profits is the sole criterion of their business. 
The white-collar crimes that they commit can be best defined as the 
illegal acts committed to enhance resources and profits by 
corporate employees on behalf of the corporation and with its 
support.1These crimes are a resultant of the deliberate acts and 
decisions of the corporate personnel to profit at the expense of its 
competitors, shareholders and general public. 
Corporations, though juristic persons, could not be jailed since it 
did not possess the body of a natural being and it only existed in 
the contemplation of the law.2Under original common law, 
companies could not be convicted for any criminal offence,3 since 
                                                          
1 ANNA LEON-GUERRERO, SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COMMUNITY, POLICY, AND 
SOCIAL ACTION 351 (Sage Publications 2013). 
2 Yedidia Z. Stern, Corporate Criminal Personal Liability: Who is The 
Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 125, 126 (1987). 
3 PAUL ROBERTS, STRICT LIABILITY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: AN 
EXPOSÉ OF FUNCTIONALIST ASSUMPTIONS37-41(Oxford Scholarship Online, 
2010). 
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they were held to be devoid of any natural existence, lacking the 
necessary mens rea and actus reus requirement.4 
However this notion changed with the modernization and 
economic development across the world when criminal liability 
was touched upon in the earliest case of Queen v. Great North of 
England Railways Co.5 It was ruled by Lord Denman, that 
corporations could be held criminally liable for misfeasance. Where 
the law required a guilty mind as a condition of a criminal offence, 
the guilty mind of the directors or the managers rendered the 
company itself guilty.6 The American courts soon began to follow 
this trend and in the course of time the court started pressing on 
extending corporate criminal liability to all crimes not requiring 
intent.7Thus, when a responsible agent of a body corporate put 
forward a document with the knowledge of its falsehood and 
intending that it should cause deception, this knowledge and 
intention was imputed to the body corporate.8 
The convergence of aggravated yet justified public outrage at the 
unfettered greed, malice, misfeasance by corporate offenders, 
sweeping legal tools, evasion tactics, and aggressive prosecutions 
                                                          
4 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., CORPORATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE,253 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 
1983). 
5 In re. Queen, (1846) 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B.). 
6 Lennard's Carrying Company Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd. 
(1915) A.C. 705, 713-714 (in certain cases, where the law requires personal 
fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the 
personal fault of the company). 
7 Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and 
an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q.  393, 396 (1981); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve? 109 (7) HARVARD L. 
R. 1477 (1996). 
8 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd., 
(1994) 1 All.E.R. 119 (DC). 




had many societal advantages. There was also a dire need for an 
effective and patent enforcement of law against corporations.9 
Attribution and Identification Principle 
In the wake of the series of corporate scandals, position of English 
Law changed tremendously. The hurdle of imputing a corporation 
for having criminal intent was overcome by the opinion of Viscount 
Haldane10 inventing a theory of primary corporate criminal liability 
for offences requiring fault which came to be known as the 
„identification theory‟ or the „alter ego‟ theory of responsibility. The 
company could not dissociate itself from the registered managing 
owner in an attempt to say that there was no actual fault or privity 
on part of the company.11This principle acknowledges the existence 
of corporate officers, who are the embodiment of the company 
when acting in its business. Landmark cases like Bolton 
Engineering Co. v. Graham12 and R v. Andrews Weatherfoil,13 have 
held that where „the acts and state of mind of those who represent 
the directing mind may be imputed to the company, is where the 
corporate will be held liable. A company may also be liable for the 
act of its servant even though that act was done in fraud of the 
company itself.14 
                                                          
9 Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations On The Use Of Criminal Sanctions In 
Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. R. 423, 430-35 (1963); 
Developments In The Law — Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behaviour 
Through Criminal Sanctions, HARVARD. L. R. 92, 1227, 1231-42 (1979); Brent 
Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. R. 468, 504-07 
(1988). 
10 Lennard‟s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1915) A.C. 
705. 
11 Id. at 713-714. 
12 H.L. Bolton Engineering, (1957) 1 All.Eng. Rep. 159 (Q.B.). 
13 Weatherfoil, (1972)1 W.L. R 118. 
14 Moore v. Bressler Ltd., (1944) 2 All.Eng. Rep. 515 (Q.B.). 
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In H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Company Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons 
Ltd.,15 Lord Denning, expressed that a company may be likened to a 
human body that had a brain and nerve centre which controlled 
what it did. It also had hands which held the tools and acted in 
accordance with directions from the centre. The personnel either 
consisted of servants and agents who were nothing more than 
hands and the others were the directors and managers who 
represented the directing mind and will of the company. The 
importance of incorporating this liability comes in certain 
circumstances when the liability has to be ascertained against the 
company as well as the human beings16. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dredge and Dock Case,17described 
the characteristics of the doctrine of identification theory, as: 
a. If according to the court an employee is the directing mind 
and will of the corporation in relation to the duty and 
responsibilities assigned to the employee by the 
corporation, the employee‟s actions and intentions are the 
action and intentions of the company itself. It was further 
provided that the employee should act within the scope of 
his authority. 
b. The essence of this test is that the identity of the directing 
mind and the company coincide when the directing mind is 
acting within his/ her assigned field of corporate operations 
i.e. field of operations may be geographic, or functional, or 
it may embrace the corporation‟s entire operations. 
c. A corporation may have more than one directing mind. 
Where corporate activities are geographically widespread, 
there will be several directing minds. 
d. Due to doctrine of identification, it is no defence for a 
corporation, to claim that: 
                                                          
15 H.L. Bolton Engineering, (1957) 1 All. Eng. Rep. 159, 172 (Q.B.). 
16 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXT BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 970 (2nd ed. 1961). 
17 R v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co., (1985) 1 S.C.R. 662. 




i. The Board of Directors or other corporate officers issued 
general or specific instructions prohibiting the criminal 
conduct. The corporation and its directing mind are one, 
and thus the prohibition from one controlling arm of the 
corporation to another controlling arm can have no effect in 
law;  
ii. The Board of Directors had no awareness of the criminal 
conduct and did not authorize or approve it. 
Therefore, a corporation is construed to be in the same position in 
relation to criminal liability as a natural person and may be 
convicted of common law and statutory offences including those 
requiring mens rea.18 However, while dealing with criminal 
prosecution with respect to certain crimes punishable with fine, in 
certain jurisdictions, a corporation cannot be convicted except as 
specifically provided by the statute.19 
Nevertheless, the courts had moved away from a blanket 
application of the identification principle towards a more critical 
examination of the statute creating the offence. In Meridian Global 
Funds Management Asia Ltd v. Securities Commission,20 it was 
held that having regard to the legislation, the appropriate rule of 
attribution to be implied was that a company knew it was a 
substantial holder in a public issuer when that holding was known 
to the person who acquired it with the company‟s authority, 
irrespective of whether that person was properly described as the 
directing mind and will. 
The UK Law even proposed to introduce a separate „failure to 
prevent‟ offence aimed at corporations, coupled with a due 
                                                          
18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE AND 
PROCEDURE, 603 (Volume 11(1), 4th ed.  London, Butterworths 1990); 
Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., (2003) 11 S.C.C. 405, 
423. 
19 Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd, (2012) 5 SCC 661; 
Avnish Bajaj v. State and Anr, 116 (2005) DLT 427; Ebay India Pvt. Ltd. v. 
State and Anr, AIR 2012 SC 2693. 
20 Meridian Global, (1995) 2 A.C. 500.  
Mishika Bajpai et al.                                                                Deeming Fiction 
61 
 
diligence defence instead of targeting the directing mind. That said, 
it is evident that the dearth of significant corporate prosecutions so 
far can be attributed entirely to the obscurities in the identification 
of the directing mind.  
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattras,21 Lord Reid clarified the 
distinction between primary liability through attribution and 
vicarious liability. Considering the nature of the personality which 
by a fiction the law attributes to a corporation, where the directors 
had set up a series of command through regional and district 
supervisors, they continued to be in control and the managers had 
to follow orders. Yet, since the board was found not to have 
delegated any of its functions, the branch manager could not be 
identified with the company. Therefore, the acts or omissions of 
shop managers could not be imputed to the company itself due to 
the delegation of the employees. 
Thus, the concept of vicarious liability, which had its origin in the 
field of tort, has come to be applied, in the field of criminal law, to a 
corporate body. This was an elaborate version of the principle of 
attribution22, which has been developed by the courts to ensure that 
the object of a penal provision is not defeated and a corporate body 
does not escape by taking the plea that a juristic person23 is 
incapable of committing any crime, far less an offence involving 
mens rea.24 The fall out of the development of the principle of 
attribution was seen in the argument that in order to make a 
corporation liable for an offence, which requires criminal intent or 
knowledge, the criminal intent or knowledge of its officer or agent 
                                                          
21 Tesco Supermarkets, (1972) 1 A.C. 153.  
22 Ross Grantham, Attributing Responsibility to Corporate Entities: A 
Doctrinal Approach, 19 COMPANIES & SEC. L.J. 168 (2001). 
23 State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 722; W.O. 
RUSSELL, RUSSELL ON CRIME, 17 (12th ed. 2001); P.S.A. PILLAI, CRIMINAL 
LAW 27 (Lexis Nexis, Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur 10th ed. 2012). 
24 Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious 
Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. R. 329, 357 (2004). 




may, in a given case, be imputed to the corporation so as to render 
it liable.25 
Principle of Deeming Fiction in India 
The above theory was missing in India since the Supreme Court 
had recognised the criminality of corporations with certain 
reservations, making its approach ill-defined and somewhat 
hesitant. Firstly, certain acts because of their nature cannot be 
committed by a corporation, such as rape, murder,26etc. and 
secondly, corporal punishment cannot be enforced against the 
corporation but the corporation could be punished by imposition of 
fine.27In order to induce compliance and establish a valid claim, 
most Indian statutes explicitly included references to corporations 
in definitions of personality28. The controversy surrounding the 
guilt of corporations in offences requiring mandatory 
imprisonment as a punishment was also argued by the Law 
Commission of India29 and an amendment to the Code had opined 
to allow the prosecution of corporations for such offences. In 
numerous cases it was argued that to permit proceedings against 
corporations for offences like cheating, which were tried with 
mandatory imprisonment, was both absurd and unfair30. Moreover, 
                                                          
25 R.S. Sodhi and Anr. and Manoranjan Pani and Ors. v. Partha Pratim 
Saikia, [2009] 151CompCas 583 (Guwahati). 
26 Patricia B. Rodella, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Has the 
Fiction Been Extended Too Far?, 4 J. L. & COM. 95, 105–09 (1984); John M. 
Hickey, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: The Controversy Flames 
Anew, 17 CAL. W. L. R. 465, 466–67 (1981). 
27 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 71 (Wadhwa & Co., 
Nagpur, 31st ed. 2006). 
28 CODE CRIM. PROC. § 11; General Clauses Act, 1897 § 3(42); Income Tax 
Act, 1961 § 2(31) (iii); Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 § 2(4); 
Competition Act, 2002 § 2(1); Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2003 § 
2(s); Indian Electricity Act, 2003 § 2(49). 
29 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Report 
No. 41 (1972), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-
50/Report41.pdf .  
30 PEN.CODE. § 420. 
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the alleged offence being one requiring the specific presence of 
mens rea could not be imputed to a company in any way. The court, 
after much speculation of the above mentioned 
authorities,31accepted the universal position that corporations 
could be liable for offences requiring mens rea.32 
The honourable Supreme Court in the case of Standard Chartered 
Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement33 while dealing with the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, observed that Section 68 
introduced a deeming provision which states that the person who 
was in charge of the company and was responsible to the company 
for the conduct of the business of the company, shall also be 
deemed to be culpable along with the company for the 
contravention of the provisions of the Act and liable to be 
proceeded against and punished accordingly.34Regarding the issue 
of proceeding against a corporation in offences necessitating 
mandatory imprisonment, the court has disallowed these claims 
and extended the ratio laid down in the Standard Chartered Case.35 
It was observed in the apex court‟s decision of Iridium India Telecom 
v. Motorola Inc.36 that the criminal liability of a corporation would 
arise when an offence is committed in relation to the business of the 
corporation by a person or a body of persons in control of its 
affairs. The degree and control of the person or the body of persons 
                                                          
31 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, (53 L. 
Ed. 613); D.P.P. v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd., (1944) 1 All. Eng. 
Rep.  119; H.L. Bolton (Engg.)Co. Ltd. v. T.J. Graham & Sons, (1956) 3 
All.Eng. Rep. 624; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass (1971) All. Eng. 
Rep. 127; The Director, Central Railway Company of Venezuela v. Joseph 
Kisch (1867) 15 W.R. 821; Lennard‟s Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. 
Ltd., (1915) A.C. 705. 
32 State of Maharashtra v. Syndicate Transport Co. (P) Ltd., 1964 Cri. L.J. 
276. 
33 Standard Chartered Bank, (2005) 4 S.C.C. 530. 
34 Id. at 543-545. 
35 Id. at 546. 
36 Iridium India Telecom, A.I.R 2011 S.C. 20. 




was established to be the requisites for identification of the 
directing mind. If the same were found to be intense then a 
corporation may be said to think and act through the person or the 
body of persons. Again, the apex court excluded the immunity of 
corporations from criminal prosecution on the grounds that they 
were incapable of possessing the necessary mens rea for the 
commission of criminal offences. In fact the notion that a 
corporation cannot be held liable for the commission of a crime had 
been discarded by adopting the Doctrine of Attribution and 
Imputation. 
This concept had a striking affinity with the statutory fiction 
applied to In Re Levy,37wherein it was held that “when a statute 
enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which, 
in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to 
ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the 
statutory fiction is to be resorted to.” Likewise East End Dwellings 
Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council38, observed that if it is to 
treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, then surely, unless 
prohibited from doing so,39also imagine as real the consequences 
and incidents, which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact 
existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. The 
statute says that it must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not 
say that having done so, it must cause or permit the imagination to 
overwhelm when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state 
of affairs. 
A corporate is assimilated into the pre-existing individualistic 
structure of law by pursuit of fiction and analogy with a natural 
person.40In other words the criminal intent of the alter ego of the 
                                                          
37 1881 (17) Ch. D. 746. 
38 East End Dwellings Company Ltd., (1952) A.C. 109. 
39  In construing the legal fiction, courts are not permitted to go beyond 
the language of the statute by which it is created, C.I.T., Bombay City v. 
Shakuntala, A.I.R 1996 S.C. 719, 722. 
40 Assistant Commissioner v. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., (2003) 11 S.C.C. 405, 
420-423. See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person": A New Analytical 
Mishika Bajpai et al.                                                                Deeming Fiction 
65 
 
company or the body corporate that guided the business of the 
company would be imposed against the corporation.41The origin of 
this theory can be traced back to the Texas Supreme Court‟s42 
description of veil piercing which can be achieved by looking at the 
actual dealings and close nexus between the shareholder and the 
corporation. Under the alter ego theory, the courts disregard the 
corporate entity when there is an existence of such unity between 
the corporation and individual, and the separate existence of the 
corporate ceases to exist, thus, making it liable.43 
A company exists, because there is a statutory rule, which provides 
that a persona ficta shall be deemed to exist, and will have certain 
powers, rights and duties of a natural person. This proposition 
about a company has to necessarily involve a reference to a set of 
rules.44 That said there would be little sense in deeming such a 
persona ficta to exist unless there were also rules to exemplify the 
acts which were to be counted as acts of the company. It is, 
therefore, a necessary part of corporate personality that there 
                                                                                                                                    
Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. 
L. J. 61, 62 (2005). 
41 Id. at 426, 437. 
42 Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex 1990); Castleberry 
v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986). 
43 The total dealings between the shareholder and the corporation are 
relevant in determining whether there is an alter ego relationship.; See 
also Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp. of Houston, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975). 
The Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the evidence may include 
“the degree to which corporate formalities have been followed and 
corporate and individual property have been kept separately, the amount 
of financial interest, ownership and control the individual maintains over 
the corporation, and whether the corporation has been used for personal 
purposes.” See Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex 
1990); Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986). 
44 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v. Securities 
Commission, (1995) 2 A.C. 413. 




should be rules by which acts are attributed to the company and 
these may be called „the Rules of Attribution‟.45 
The true extent of the rule of attribution is yet to be ascertained in 
Indian law. The current trend46 of simply aggregating the acts and 
omissions of two or more natural persons acting for the corporation 
could have absurd results, as seen in United States v. Bank of New 
England.47 It has been observed quite often that corporations 
acquire a momentum and dynamism of their own which 
temporarily transcends the actions of their officers.48 Companies 
strategically maintain control from afar but leave certain operations 
and safety mandates in the hands of local managers and the host 
government.49 This way the control can be maintained, while 
liability is evaded.50 In these cases, the simple aggregative Rule of 
Attribution would not suffice in attaching liability.51 
                                                          
45 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 25–30 (2008); Jess M. Kannich, supra note 41 at 64-90. 
46 Helen Anderson, Directors‟ Liability for Corporate Faults and Defaults - An 
International Comparison, 18 PAC. RIM L. &POL‟Y J. 1, 34–44 (2009). 
47 United States, 821 F.2d 844 (1987). The knowledge of a corporation is the 
sum of the knowledge of all of its employees; totality of what all the 
employees know within the scope of their employment. A corporation 
could plead immunity by asserting that the information obtained by 
several employees was not acquired by any one individual who then 
would have comprehended the full import. 
48 ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 117 (5th ed. 2006). 
49 Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). 
50 Cassels, Jamie, “The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons From Bhopal”, 29 
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 1, 20 (1991). 
51 The company and the individuals acting for it merge into a single legal 
entity, and the individual‟s acts are distributed from the individual and 
attributed to the company. See Grantham, supra note 23 at 171; See Stern, 
supra note 2 at 129; See also Yedidia Z. Stern, Corporate Liability for 
Unauthorized Contracts-Unification of the Rules of Corporate Representation, 9 
U. PA. J. INT‟L BUS. L. 649 (1987). 
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However, India too is taking a step forward to incorporate the 
principle by creating a deeming fiction in law so as to attach 
liability to the law breakers. The major reason for not having the 
Identification and Attribution Principle incorporated into the 
Indian corporate law was because the Principle of Deeming Fiction 
fit well into the system and provided for improved affixing of 
liability. 
In the landmark judgments of Aneeta Hada v.Godfather Travels and 
Tours Pvt. Ltd., and Avnish Bajaj v. State and Ebay India Pvt. Ltd. v. 
State and Anr.,52 the honourable Supreme Court, while dealing with 
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, observed that 
when a statute clearly stipulated that a person which is a company 
commits an offence, then certain categories of persons in charge as 
well as the company would be deemed to be liable for the offences 
under the given section. Thus, the statutory intendment is 
absolutely plain. When a legal fiction is raised, the ingredients must 
be satisfied. The provision makes the functionaries and the 
companies liable by virtue of deeming fiction.53It has been held to 
be the bounden duty of the court to ascertain for what purpose the 
legal fiction has been created. It is also the duty of the court to 
imagine the fiction with all real consequences and instances unless 
prohibited from doing so.54However, legal fictions are created only 
for some definite purpose. The court has to give effect to the 
language of the section when it is unambiguous and admits of no 
doubt regarding its interpretation, particularly when a legal fiction 
is embedded in that section.55 That apart, the use of the term 
„deemed‟ has to be read in its context and further, the fullest logical 
purpose and import are to be understood.56 
                                                          
52. Aneeta Hada, (2012) 5 S.C.C. 661. 
53 Matrix Cellular Services Pvt. Ltd. Through Capt. Rakesh Walia v. Sanjoy 
Mukherji & Ors., 196 (2013) D.L.T. 649; Raj Pal Kapil v. State of Himachal 
Pradesh and Another, 2013 (3) Shim.L.C. 1248. 
54The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., A.I.R. 
1955 S.C. 661. 
55 N. Elangovan v. C. Ganesan, 2014 (4) M.L.J. (Crl.) 517. 
56 Aneeta Hada, (2012) 5 S.C.C. 661 




In Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India (UOI) and 
Anr.,57 the Court adopted the purposive construction of the 
enactment and held that that a legal fiction has a limited scope and 
it cannot be expanded by giving purposive interpretation 
particularly if the result of such interpretation is to transform the 
concept of chargeability of the provision. Section 9(1)(i) of the Act 
applied to the assessment of income of non-residents and held that 
it was brought in by the legislature to avoid any possible argument 
on the part of the non- resident vendor that profit accrued or arose 
outside India by reason of the contract to sell having been executed 
outside India; rather this income was fictionally deemed to accrue 
or arise in India.58 
Reading into the intent of the legislature, the Constitution Bench, in 
the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugars Ltd.,59 while dealing 
with the deeming provision in a statute, ruled that the role of a 
provision in a statute creating legal fiction is well settled. The 
Bench made reference to The Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Lala 
Karam Chand Thapar Etc.60 J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills 
Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.61, M. Venugopal v. Divisional 
Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India62 and Harish 
Tandon v. Addl. District Magistrate, Allahabad63 and eventually held 
that when a statute creates a legal fiction saying that something 
shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not 
been done, the court has to examine and ascertain as to for what 
purpose and between whom, such a statutory fiction is to be 
resorted to and thereafter, the courts have to give full effect to such 
a statutory fiction and it has to be carried to its logical conclusion. 
                                                          
57 Vodafone International Holdings B.V., (2012) 6 S.C.C. 613. 
58 Id. at 672-675. 
59 State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1815. 
60 The Chief Inspector of Mines, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 838. 
61 J.K. Cotton Spinning, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 191. 
62 M. Venugopal, (1994) 2 S.C.C. 323. 
63 Harish Tandon, (1995) 1 S.C.C. 537. 
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In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.v. Neeta Bhalla and Anr.,64 it has been 
observed that the criminal liability on account of dishonour of 
cheque primarily falls on the drawee (sic drawer) company and is 
extended to the officers of the company and as there is a specific 
provision extending the liability to the officers, the conditions 
incorporated in the section are to be satisfied. Therefore, if a party 
attempts to use the Alter Ego Doctrine to characterize the assets of 
a corporation as the assets of its shareholder, such „reverse piercing‟ 
may be sought in order to hold a corporation liable for the 
controlling shareholder‟s debt. Since, it is a rule that a corporate 
officer or agent is personally liable to third parties if he sanctions, 
directs or actively participates in the commission of an offence65; 
unless it was proved that an accused had participated in issuing 
any cheque, he could not be held responsible for the dishonour of 
the same.  
Considering the vicarious liability of the directors, managing 
director and chairman of a corporate entity in penal offences, the 
Supreme Court reiterated that no vicarious liability can be 
attributed unless the statute specifically provided so. It is well 
settled that penal provisions must be construed strictly and in case 
no vicarious liability is provided in the statute, the same cannot be 
attributed.66Thus, an individual who has perpetrated the 
commission of an offence on behalf of a company can be accused, 
along with the company, provided there is sufficient evidence of 
his active role coupled with a criminal intent. Second situation in 
which he can be implicated is in those cases where the statutory 
regime itself attracts the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability, by 
specifically incorporating such a provision.67 
                                                          
64 S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 89. 
65 Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Intern.,Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1110 
(D. Ariz. 2006); Mill Run Assocs. v. 
Locke Prop. Co., 282 F. Supp.2d 278, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
66 Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 S.C.C. 630. 
67 Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 
923; Vinod Kashyap and Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation,2015 (1) 
J.C.C. 749. 




However, even if such a state of mind is imputed to a corporation, 
in cases where punishment for the offence necessitates mandatory 
imprisonment,68 the stage of sentencing creates a fresh quandary 
for the courts. This hurdle is overcome by the crystallization of 
vicarious liability of a person who was in charge of company, since 
a company by itself cannot be punished, in the sense that a 
sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed upon it. On the legal 
principle that the essence of vicarious liability is inextricably 
entwined with the liability of the primary or principal offender; the 
Principle of Vicarious Liability has been enacted by deeming fiction 
as it were, prescribing that every person at the time of commission 
of the offence, in charge of and responsible to its affairs, shall be 
deemed guilty. The emphasis here is that vicarious liability is 
fastened on every person who was in charge at the time of 
commission of the offence concerned.69 
Therefore, applying the deeming fiction in its complete sense itself 
will have the requisite effect, ostracizing the vague concepts of 
„identification‟, „attribution‟ and „lifting the corporate veil‟ and, in 
fact, put the directors and the officers responsible in a deemed 
concept compartment, based on certain guided parameters. 
Conclusion 
After rendering due regard to the circumstances of each case, the 
scheme of the provision gives choice to the complainant to proceed 
against some or all such directors, „deemed liable‟. Accordingly, it 
is advisable that the courts should first scrutinize the character of 
the duty that has purportedly been breached and then conclude as 
to whom such duty is owed, instead of only examining the 
participation in an act, negligent conduct of the director or officer, 
or exercise of control over a business. It is pertinent to note that the 
directors and officers of the company discharging the internal 
duties, such as supervisory or management tasks within the 
framework is protected from liability which should fall directly on 
                                                          
68 Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 S.C.C. 
530, 563. 
69Meenu Bhist v. Vijay Kumar Gupta and Anr., 141 (2007) D.L.T. 923. 
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the corporation as such. Conversely, culpability should be 
arraigned for breaches of external duties wherein a negligent 
conduct forms a major part of the breach. Nonetheless, this relief 
from personal liability risks the misuse by engaging in intentional 
infliction of harm and fraudulent conduct. The duty based and 
participation theories can be put to good use to impute liability. 
Nevertheless, a blanket application of any principle cannot be 
constructive. 
Even then this form of a statutory fiction has proven to be a much 
successful mechanism in such cases as it is open to the person 
concerned, to prove that the offence was committed without his or 
her knowledge and that he or she had exercised all due diligence to 
prevent the commission of such offence and break the deeming 
fiction and ultimately get acquitted. It may be implemented when 
the judiciary explicitly states that when the company is the 
offender, vicarious liability of the directors cannot be imputed 
automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this 
effect. Besides fastening liability upon the company and such 
persons on the basis of „deemed culpability‟, the penal clauses in 
the above mentioned legislations contain a provision to impose 
liability upon director, manager, secretary or other officer of the 
company, if it is proved that the offence has been committed with 
the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on 
the part of, any such director, manager, secretary or other officer of 
the company, and he shall also be deemed to be guilty of that 
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished 
accordingly. In cases where the corporation is insolvent and 
corporate agents cannot be the subject of any claims, the offended 
creditor may not have sufficient recourse. The company as well as 
every individual responsible to the company for the conduct of 
business of the company, at the time of commission of the offence is 
deemed to be guilty of that offence. This does not however lead to 
an assumption that each and every director or each and every 
person responsible to the conduct of its business has to necessarily 
be impleaded in the complaint and proceeded with. In the 
corporate context, courts should embark on examining whether the 
culpability falls on the corporation, the director or officer, or both, 
who owed a duty to the third party.  
